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  In this paper we estimate the effects of children and the differential effects of sons and 
daughters on men’s labor supply and hourly wage rates. The responses to fatherhood of two 
cohorts of men from the PSID sample are examined separately, and we use fixed effects 
estimation to control for unobserved heterogeneity.  We find that fatherhood significantly 
increases the hourly wage rates and annual hours of work for men from both cohorts.  Most 
notably, men’s labor supply and wage rates increase more in response to the births of sons than to 
the births of daughters. (JEL:  J23, J16, J22, J24)
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I.  Introduction   
 
The impact of fatherhood on men’s labor market outcomes has received little attention 
from economists, in contrast to the central role played by children in studies of women’s labor 
supply. However, there is good reason to think that parenthood does affect men’s labor supply and 
hourly earnings.  Though child care has traditionally been viewed as the wives’ responsibility, 
children place demands on the time and financial resources of the entire household. If the labor 
market decisions of husbands and wives are interdependent, we would expect parenthood to 
affect men’s wages and labor supply.  Since women’s roles in the labor market and the family 
have changed dramatically in recent decades, we would also expect to see a shift in the 
relationship between children and men’s labor market behavior. 
In this paper, we estimate the effect of children on men’s labor supply and hourly wages 
using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Our fixed effects estimates 
indicate that, on average, a child increases a man’s wage rate by 4.2 percent and his annual hours 
of work by 38 hours per year. However, the effects of children are highly non-linear and non-
monotonic, with significant positive incremental effects limited to the first two children.  
Comparison of OLS and fixed effects estimates suggest that there is substantial heterogeneity bias 
in conventional cross-section estimates of the effect of fatherhood on men’s outcomes. We 
compare the behavior of two cohorts--men born in and before 1950, and men born after 1950--and 
find that the relationship between children and men’s labor supply and wages has shifted over 
time. 
Our most notable results relate to the effects of child gender on men’s labor market 
outcomes. Sons increase men’s annual hours of work and wage rates significantly more than do 
daughters.  Fathers of both cohorts respond differently to sons and daughters, though the gender 
effects are more pronounced in the hours worked of the late cohort and the hourly wage rates of   3
the early cohort.   We find little evidence of an effect of child gender on the labor market 
outcomes of mothers, and are unable to explain our results in terms of differences in the expected 
pecuniary returns to boys and girls in the United States.  Our results are consistent with a model in 
which the gender composition of a couple’s offspring affects the returns to marriage, and this has 
implications for future research. 
Section II presents the background for our analysis in terms of the theoretical 
underpinnings and the related empirical literature.  Section III describes the data.   Section IV 
outlines the empirical specification and econometric issues.  The results are presented in Section 
V, and Section VI discusses the finding on gender differences.  Section VII is concludes.  
 
II.  Background 
Theory 
Why would children affect men’s labor market outcomes?  There is substantial evidence 
that motherhood reduces women’s labor supply and wages.
1  The fall in mothers’ labor supply is 
attributed to the increased value of women’s home time after having a child (Becker [1985]), and 
the decline in wage rates to a fall in market productivity due to reduced time and effort on the job.
2  
Given the evidence that husbands’ and wives’ labor market outcomes are interdependent,
3  we 
would expect this reallocation of mothers’ time to be accompanied by some labor market response 
among fathers.  
  We would expect parenthood to have two effects on the value of parents’ time in the 
household.  First, consistent with Becker’s work, there is the specialization effect due to the 
                                                                 
1  For example, Mroz [1987], Korenman and Neumark [1992], Neumark and Korenman [1994], Lundberg and 
Rose [1998].  For summaries of the literature, see Browning [1992] and Waldfogel [1998]. 
2  Alternative explanations include discrimination against mothers, and a wage penalty that compensates for 
more flexible work arrangements. 
3  Lundberg [1988] finds evidence of interdependence in husbands’ and wives’ labor supplies in households   4
increased value of wives’ time relative to that of husbands.  This generally takes the form of 
wives’ increasing their focus on home production while husbands concentrate more on the labor 
market.  The magnitude of the specialization effect depends on husbands’ and wives market 
wages and relative productivities in the household.   
Second, in Lundberg and Rose [1999] we introduce an additional effect which we term 
the  home- (relative to market-) intensity effect.  This results from the increased value of both 
parents’ time as inputs to child care after a child is born.  This effect leads to an increase in total 
household resources devoted to the home in response to parenthood. 
In our framework, the predicted effects of children on women’s outcomes are 
unambiguous: both the specialization and the home-intensity effects on labor supply are negative.  
However, for men they are ambiguous.  We would expect the specialization effect to be negative, 
but the home-intensity effect to be positive. The greater the extent to which fathers share in 
parenting responsibilities, the more likely it is that the home-intensity effect will dominate the 
specialization effect, leading to a fall in hours worked after the birth of a child.
4 
The effects of children on fathers’ labor market outcomes are likely to vary by parity level 
and by cohort.  We expect the potential gains from specialization to decline with parity, as the 
decreases in mothers’ labor supply are largest for the first two children.   This implies that the 
effects of children on men’s wages may be non-linear or even non-monotonic, and we allow for 
this in our empirical analysis.   
The level of marital specialization appears to have declined for more recent cohorts of 
couples, as women’s and men’s productivities have become more similar.  However, this does not 
necessarily imply that the change in specialization associated with the birth of a child has fallen.  
If, for more recent cohorts, households are substantially less specialized immediately following 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
with young children.   5
marriage, there may be a larger increase following the birth of the first child.  Similarly, decreases 
in the level of home-intensity associated with an expansion of the market for substitutes for 
parental time in home production, do not necessarily imply that the change in home-intensity in 
response to the birth of a child is negative.  Therefore the sign, and magnitude, of the cohort 
differences in the effects of children on men’s outcomes is an empirical question. 
Literature 
  Most research on the relationship between household roles and men’s labor market 
outcomes has focused on the effect of marriage on wages.  Married men earn more than single 
men with the same education and experience, but it has not been clear whether marriage makes 
men more productive, or more productive men select into marriage.  Korenman and Neumark 
[1991] estimate this marriage premium using fixed effects and find that married men earn 
approximately 6 percent more than single men and that the premium accrues gradually over the 
course of the marriage.  Their analyses of data from one firm’s records on reviews, wages, and 
personal characteristics of professionals and managers indicate that the effect of marriage arises 
through promotions rather than through a premium for married men within a job category.  Taken 
together, their findings suggest that much of the marriage premium can be attributed to increased 
productivity of married men, perhaps due to returns to specialization within the household.  Gray 
[1997] finds that the marriage wage premium has fallen over time and attributes this to declining 
specialization of husbands and wives.   
There have been only a few attempts to measure the effect of parenthood on men’s labor 
supply and wages.  Pencavel [1986] finds that young children are associated with longer work 
hours for men in the 1980 U.S. Census, and Waldfogel [1998] reports that the wages of young 
men in 1980 and 1991 NLS samples are higher if they have two or more children.  However, both 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
4 Similarly, the effect of children on men’s wages is ambiguous a priori.   6
of these studies use cross-section data and do not correct for endogeneity.  To the extent that 
fathering children is endogenous with respect to labor market outcomes or correlated with 
unobservables in the wage or labor supply equations, the estimated effects of fatherhood will be 
subject to bias.    
Angrist and Evans [1998] use instrumental variables to estimate the effect of the birth of 
a third child on the labor supply of men and women, and find no significant effect of this birth on 
men’s labor supply.  In Lundberg and Rose [2000a] we estimate age-hours and age-wage profiles 
for husbands and wives with and without children under fixed effects. However, if the effects of 
children on men’s outcomes are non-monotonic, or even non-linear, with respect to parity, the 
results of these two studies will not be generalizable to other parities.  
 
III.  Data 
  We examine the effects of both marital status and parenthood on work hours and wages, 
using a sample of men drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  Our sample 
spans the entire period over which data were available to us from the PSID:  1968 through 1992.  
The dependent variables are annual hours of work and the (log of the) real hourly wage rate.  The 
wage rate was computed as total annual labor income divided by annual hours of work, and 
deflated to 1983 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.  
  Marital status was measured as a dummy variable indicating whether the individual 
reported having been married in a particular year.
5   Fertility measures were constructed from the 
                                                                 
5 We construct marital status and fertility variables using the Marriage History file and the Childbirth and 
Adoption History file, which contain retrospective fertility and marriage information beginning in 1985 and 
updated in each subsequent survey.  Alternative indicators of marital status based on questions asked in 
each year can be constructed from PSID data.  We have used the retrospective data for two reasons.  First,  
for some of our analysis we use data on length of current marriage, and this variable can only be 
constructed with the retrospective data.  Therefore, our measure of marital status will be consistent with the 
data on length of marriage.  Second, the retrospective data asks about marriages per se, and the alternative   7
fertility histories and include all children ever born, whether currently living with the father or not.
6  
In addition to the total number of offspring, we calculated the number of children by gender, 
whether the man had at least one son or daughter, and whether the man had a first child that was 
a son or a daughter.   
Additional regressors used as controls in all empirical models were age, education, and 
year of the observation, all of which are entered as a series of dummy variables to allow for non-
linearities.  In some analyses, we control for the length of the marriage using values calculated 
from the marital history. 
Our raw PSID sample consisted of 26809 observations on 2304 white male heads of 
household who were born in 1943 or later, and for whom fertility and marital histories exist.
7  
Observations were deleted for the following reasons: the man was under age 18 or over age 60 (5 
observations), education was missing (30 observations), the marriage history indicates that the 
man was in two marriages simultaneously (44 observations), the man had a child but did not report 
its gender (77 observations), hours worked was missing (448 observations).  The final sample 
consisted of 26205 observations on 2243 individuals.   
To examine changes in household responses to children over time, we divided the sample 
into two cohorts - men born in or before 1950 and men born after 1950.  Means and standard 
deviations of the variables used in the analysis are reported in Table 1. 
Table 2 reports the frequency distribution of children by parity for each cohort.  
Approximately 89 percent of the men in the early cohort and 66 percent of the men in the later 
cohort have had at least one child.  This difference may be due to both cohort effects and age 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
measures at times categorize cohabitors as married.  For a more detailed discussion of the issues involved in 
choosing marriage variables, see Lillard and Waite [1990]. 
6 We used children (reported to have been) fathered rather than children living with their father, since 
coresidence may be endogenous. 
7 Rendell et al [1999] find evidence of significant underreporting of children for non-whites but not for   8
effects, as the average age is 34 for the early cohort and 28 for the later cohort. Very few men 
have more than four children (about 2 percent for the early cohort and 1 percent for the later 
cohort ).  Therefore, in our empirical analysis, we focus on the effects of the first few children, 
and include a separate dummy variable for observations with more than four children.   
Table 3 reports frequency counts for number of children by gender.  We note that fewer 
men report having any daughters than any sons in the early cohort (216 have no daughters and 
195 have no sons).  This is in contrast to what would be expected biologically, given that about 105 
boys are born for every 100 girls, and about equal numbers of boys and girls survive until age 5 in 
the U.S.   
Undercounting can be detected by comparing the total number of boys relative to girls 
born.  For the early cohort, men report having about 110 boys for every girl (649 boys and 590 
girls, in total), and for the later cohort, the numbers are approximately equal (1112 boys and 1102 
girls).  The apparent overreporting of sons relative to daughters by the early cohort is quite 
striking, since it is generally believed that bias in favor of male children is relatively mild in the 
U.S. and other developed countries.
8  We suspect that this preponderance of sons is due to 
systematic recall bias:  men in the early cohort are more likely to recall the birth of a child if it is a 
son relative to a daughter, particularly if the birth is nonmarital or from a prior marriage.
9   
 
IV.   Empirical Specification and Econometric Issues 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
whites in the PSID retrospective data.  
8 This is in contrast to parts of Asia, where pro-male bias is believed to be more acute (Behrman [1997]).  In 
particular, in parts of India, pro-male bias leads to excess mortality of female children relative to males, and 
mother’s reports of births of sons relative to daughters are particularly high (Rose [1999]).  Both of these 
factors lead to an econometric concern for the “endogeneity of gender” that is discussed in Section IV. 
9 However, women’s reports of the numbers of sons born relative to daughters do not appear to be biased. 
In Lundberg and Rose [2000b] we use data from the women’s marital and fertility histories to estimate a 
hazard model of the likelihood a woman marries, subsequent to a non-marital birth, and find that women who 
have sons marry sooner than women who have daughters.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
fathers underreport daughters because they are less likely to have contact with daughters born non-  9
We undertake two parallel analyses.  We estimate identical sets of wage and reduced-
form labor supply equations.  Because the equations describing the two outcomes contain identical 
sets of regressors, and we do not need to test cross-equation restrictions, the equations can be 
estimated separately.  







it MAR it u D D D MARR Y
it it + + + + + = ￿ ￿ ￿ b b b b a      (1) 
where the subscript “i” indicates individual and “t’ indicates time. Y is the outcome of interest (the 
log of the real hourly wage rate, or annual hours of work), MARR  is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the individual is married, DAge is a series of dummy variables for each year of age of the 
individual, DYear  is a series of dummy variables representing the year of the observation,  and 
DEduc is a series of dummy variables indicating the number of years of education.
10   
Since both age and education are included as regressors, an estimate of Mincerian 
experience is implicitly included in these estimates.  We do not include actual experience, or 
controls for occupation or industry, as these variables are endogenous in the theoretical 
framework underlying our estimating equations.  In these respects our estimates of the effect of 
the marriage are not comparable with those reported in Korenman and Neumark [1991] and Gray 
[1997], and our estimates of the male “family gap” are not analogous to those in Waldfogel 
[1998].   
We introduce children into the analysis in two ways.  In a linear specification, we include 
the variable NKID04, which is the number of children if the man has four children or less and 
zero otherwise, and a dummy variable for five or more children (DKID5); i.e.: 
   it DKID it NKID it MARR it DKID NKID MARR Y 5 04 5 04 b b b a + + + + =  
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In a non-linear specification we include instead a series of dummy variables DKID1 
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 We only examine the effects for the first four children because there are so few observations for 
men with five or more children (See Table 2).
11 
  These models are estimated two ways.  First, we estimate OLS
12 equations to obtain 
estimates that are more comparable to what would be found in a conventional cross-section 
analysis.  OLS estimation of these models may yield substantially biased coefficients due to 
heterogeneity – i.e., a man’s fertility may be correlated with unobservables in the estimating 
equations.  There are essentially three approaches for dealing with this problem.  The first is using 
an instrumental variables procedure, such as two-stage least squares.  However, this procedure 
would require data on some variable that is correlated with the measures of fertility, but 
uncorrelated with the error terms.  It is in practice very difficult to find such an instrument.  For 
instance, Angrist and Evans  [1998] use the sex composition of the first two children in a family to 
instrument for whether a third child is born.  This is appropriate given the evidence that parents’ 
preference for balanced families leads them to be more likely to have a third child if the first two 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
10  The few observations with 17 or more years of education are grouped together. 
11 We estimated the effects of children without separating out the highest parities and found that the 
coefficients for these parities were unstable, imprecisely estimated, and implausibly large, but that including 
them did not have much impact on the coefficients for lower parities.  These results are reported in Appendix 
Tables A.1.1 and A.1.2. 
12 With huberized standard errors in order to allow for the fact that we have repeated observations by 
individual (Huber [1967]).   11
children are the same sex.  However, since this approach can only be used to examine the effect 
of the third child on outcomes, it will not be useful for our problem. 
  The other two approaches involve some form of fixed effects.  Under sibling fixed 
effects, data on brothers would be used.  Here, the subscript “i” would refer to family, and “t” 
would refer to brother, and the intercept a would be allowed to vary by family. This approach 
assumes that the portion of the unobservables that is correlated with the regressors is constant 
within family.  Biases would arise if, say, more attractive brothers tend to have more favorable 
labor market outcomes, and be more likely to marry or father children.   
The third approach is individual fixed effects.  In this case, a varies by individual, and as 
discussed above, the subscript “i” refers to individual and “t” refers to time.
13  This approach is 
commonly used in this literature; for instance, Korenman and Neumark [1992] and Waldfogel 
[1997] on the effect of children on women’s wages, and Korenman and Neumark’s [1991] on the 
marriage premium.  This is the strategy we follow. 
Individual fixed effects estimates may still exhibit endogeneity or omitted variable bias, for 
two reasons.  First, timing of marriage and parenthood may be caused by, or correlated with, 
actual or expected shocks to the outcome.  For instance, men may time marriage or childbirth at a 
time when they expect to receive a promotion and a raise.  Second, men with higher growth rates 
of wages may be more likely to get married or have more children.  Because hours tend to be 
more stable over time than wages, we believe this is less likely to be a problem in the hours 
equations. 
 
                                                                 
13 In our specification, it is necessary to eliminate the year dummies from the fixed effects specification 
because they are perfectly collinear with the fixed effects and the age dummies.   12
The Effects of Sons vs. Daughters 
  In order to estimate the effects of sons relative to daughters on wages and hours work we 
estimate several variants of Equations (2) and (3) under fixed effects. 
First, we examine the differential effect of the number of boys and girls.  We measure the 
number of boys and girls as NBOY03 and NGIRL03, which refer to the number of boys and girls 
if there are less than three.  Observations in which there are more than three boys or girls are 
dummied out with the variable GIRBOYG3.  The first specification of the model used to estimate 
gender-specific effects, then, is: 
0303 itiMARRitNBOYitNGIRLit YMARRNBOYNGIRL abbb =+++      
  3 3
it GIRBOYGitAgeAgeEducEducit it
AgeEduc
GIRBOYGDDu bbb ++++ ￿￿       (4) 
 Second, we note that Morgan, Lye, and Condron’s [1988] finding on the effect of sons 
relative to daughters on marital survival probabilities pertained to whether there was at least one 
son or at least one daughter, and Butcher and Case’s [1993] finding on the effect of brothers on 
girls’ education relates to the presence of at least one brother.  Therefore, in the second 
specification we include the variables IFBOY and IFGIRL indicating whether the man has at least 
one son or daughter; i.e.,  






it + + + ￿ ￿ b b           (5) 
Third, we include the dummy variables FIRBOY and FIRGIR indicating that the man has 
had at least one child and the first child was a boy or girl, respectively; i.e.,  
it FIRGIRL it FIRBOY it MARR i it FIRGIRL FIRBOY MARR Y b b b a + + + =  
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  Finally, in the non-linear specification, we include two sets of dummy variables 
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GIRBOYGDDu bbb ++++ ￿￿       (7) 
All of these equations are estimated under individual fixed effects.  To the extent that the gender 
composition of a man’s offspring is random, the issues of endogeneity and heterogeneity with 
respect to actual or expected shocks to hours or wages are not of concern. 
  However, the sex ratios reported in Section III suggest that births of girls are 
underreported for the cohort of men born before 1950. This means that gender is potentially 
endogenous; i.e., the probability that a son is reported to have been born, or survive, relative to a 
daughter, may be correlated with unobservables in regressions of the effects of a child’s gender 
on individual or household level outcomes.  If the underreporting is systematic with respect to 
shocks to earnings or hours, then the difference in the effects of sons and daughters will be 
biased.  This seems unlikely.  Alternatively, if men in the early cohort who have high growth rates 
of hours or wages are more likely to under-report daughters, then the effects of sons vs. 
daughters will be biased upward.  This possibility cannot be eliminated, but we do note that it’s 
unlikely to be an issue with the hours equations, or for the later cohort.
14   
 
IV.  Results 
                                                                 
14 For further discussion of the econometric implications of endogenous gender, see Rose [2000]. 
   14
The Effects of Children on Wages and Hours (Tables 4 and 5) 
Table 4 presents the results regarding the effects of marriage and children on hourly wage 
rates. Table 4a reports results for the entire sample, and Table 4b reports the results by cohorts. 
Columns (1) through (3) contain the OLS estimates, and columns (4) through (6) contain the fixed 
effects estimates.  Columns (1) and (4) present the base specifications without children, columns 
(2) and (5) are the linear child specifications and columns (3) and (6) are the non-linear 
specifications.   The estimated incremental effect of each child, and the standard error of the 
incremental effect, are reported in the shaded regions of column (3) and (6). 
The fixed effects results for the base specification reported in column (4) indicate that 
married men earn approximately 6.2  percent more than single men, holding constant age, 
education, race, and year of observation.  Adding NKID04 and DKID5 into the regression in 
column (5) reduces the estimate of the marriage premium slightly to 5.7 percent.  The coefficient 
on NKID4 is .042 and statistically significant.  This means that each additional child is associated 
with an increase in wages of approximately 4.2 percent. The coefficient on the dummy variable 
DKID5 is also positive and significant. The results in column (6) indicate that the relationship 
between number of children and hourly wages is highly non-linear.  The first child increases 
wages by 7.1 percent (t=5.9), the second by an additional 6.0 percent (t=5.5), and the incremental 
effects of the third and fourth child are small and insignificant. 
 The OLS results in columns (1)-(3) indicate a somewhat larger marriage premium (10 
percent rather than 6 percent) and a substantially smaller effect of children (1.7 percent per child 
rather than 4.2 percent).  The fall in the marriage coefficient when we move from OLS to fixed 
effect estimates indicates that one reason that married men earn more than single men is positive 
selection: men with higher levels of the unobservables affecting wages are more likely to get 
married.  This positive selection effect in terms of marriage is consistent with the findings of   15
Korenman and Neumark [1991] and Gray [1997].  However, the implied selection into fatherhood 
is negative.  The estimated effects of children are higher under fixed effects relative to OLS in 
both the linear specification in column (5) and for each parity in the non-linear specification in 
column (6).  This means that, although fatherhood itself increases wages, having children is 
associated with lower levels of unobservables in the wage equation.   
The effect of heterogeneity can be seen graphically in Figure 1a, which plots the OLS 
coefficients (solid line) and the fixed effects coefficients (dashed  line) against the number of 
children.  A diamond sign (￿) indicates that the respective coefficient is significantly different from 
zero (at the 10 percent level).  A square (￿) indicates that the coefficient is significantly different 
from the coefficient for the previous parity.   
Figure 1 shows that, for each parity, the fixed effects coefficient is greater than the 
respective OLS coefficient.  The difference at parity 4 is particularly striking: the OLS estimates 
suggest that having a fourth child relative to a third reduces wages substantially, but the fixed 
effect estimate indicates that this drop is due entirely to heterogeneity.   
The analyses reported in Table 4a are repeated by cohort and presented in Table 4b.   For 
both cohorts, we find positive marriage premia and evidence of positive selection into marriage.  
We find, as does Gray, that the marriage premium has fallen over time:  our fixed effects 
estimates indicate that it has been reduced by half. For both cohorts, there is evidence that 
fatherhood increases wages and that negative selection into fatherhood is present.  In the linear 
specification for the early cohort, the selection effect apparently nearly outweighs the true effect 
and the estimated OLS relationship between the number of children and wages is small and 
insignificant.   
The effects of children on men’s wages appear to have changed over time.  The 
incremental effects of the first two children are about half as large for the later cohort (5.7   16
percent vs. 9.7 percent for the first child, and 4.2 percent vs. 8.4 percent for the second child.) 
The incremental effect of the third child is significantly negative for the early cohort, and positive 
but not highly significant for the later cohort.  For the early cohort, the effects of children are 
highly non-linear and non-monotonic; for the later cohort the effects are monotonic and 
approximately linear (see Figures 1b and 1c).   
  The analysis of the determinants of wages reported in Table 4 is repeated for total hours 
of work in Table 5. The formats of the tables and figures are identical.  The results for the entire 
sample reported in Table 5a indicate that men work more hours per year after marriage, in 
addition to earning more per hour.    The OLS estimates indicate that married men work 
approximately 201 hours per year more than single men;  the comparable fixed effects estimate is 
115 hours per year.  In hours as well as hourly wages, there is evidence of positive selection into 
marriage, as the fixed effects estimates are approximately half the magnitudes of the OLS 
estimates for the entire sample, and for each cohort individually.  Comparing the estimates for the 
two cohorts indicates that the marriage “premium” in terms of hours of work has increased 
somewhat over time.  
  Having children significantly increases men’s annual hours of work.  For the sample as a 
whole, the linear OLS estimate of the effect of children is 46 hours per year per child and the 
comparable fixed effects estimate is 38 hours per child.  The non-linear fixed effects estimates 
reported in column (6) indicate that men work approximately 82 hours per year more (t=5.5) after 
the birth of the first child and 26 hours per year more (t=1.9) after the second child.  The 
incremental effects of subsequent children are not statistically significant, nor is the effect of 
having more than 4 children. 
Interpretation of the non-linear estimates by cohort is facilitated by examining Figures 2b 
and 2c.  For the early cohort, the fixed effects coefficients are less than the OLS coefficients for   17
each parity, and they indicate a step-function relationship between children and men’s labor 
supply.  The effect of the first child is positive and significant, but the effects of subsequent 
children are all small.  For the later cohort, however, the effects of each child on hours of work 
are positive and significant.  
  In summary, men work more hours and earn more per hour after becoming fathers, 
although the incremental effects of children are non-linear.  For the early cohort the relationship is 
non-monotonic.   The first two children increase wages, but subsequent children reduce them. For 
hours of work, the relationship is a step function, with the first child leading to higher labor supply, 
and no effect of children at higher parities. In terms of the framework in Lundberg and Rose 
[1999] and discussed in Section II, the specialization effect outweighs the market intensity effect 
for the first one or two children, but the market intensity effect dominates or cancels out the 
specialization effect for higher parities.  For the late cohort, in contrast, the positive effect of the 
first four children on hours and wages is approximately linear. 
The Effects of Boys vs. Girls on Wages and Hours (Tables 6 and 7) 
The results for the gender-specific effects on hourly wage rates and hours worked 
(Equations 4 – 7) are reported in Tables 6 and 7, respectively.  In each, the results for the entire 
sample are reported in column (1), for men born in or before 1950 in column (2), and for men born 
subsequent to 1950 in column (3).  The differential effects of sons vs. daughters are reported in 
the shaded portions of the tables. 
  For the sample as a whole, the gender of the man’s offspring does not significantly affect 
his wage rate.  However, when we disaggregate by cohort, more striking patterns emerge.   
  For men in the early cohort, we find significantly higher wages for fathers of sons relative 
to daughters in most of the specifications.  Each son raises wages by approximately 3 percent 
more than each daughter, and this difference is significant (t=1.9).  Men with at least one son earn   18
2.9 percent more than men with at least one daughter, although this effect is not significant.  
However, men whose first child was a son earn approximately 5.3 percent more per hour than 
men whose first child was a daughter and this is statistically significant (t=1.8).  The non-linear 
specification at the bottom of column (2) indicates that for each gender-specific parity men earn 
more after having sons relative to daughters, but these results are statistically significant only for 
the third boy or girl.  There are no significant gender-specific effects on wages for men born after 
1950. 
  The gender-specific effects on men’s hours of work reported in Table 7 are striking.  For 
the full sample, we find that men work significantly more if they have at least one son vs. at least 
one daughter  (53 hours per year, t=2.5) or if their first child was a boy rather than a girl (65 hours 
per year, t=2.7).  In the non-linear estimates we again find hours are significantly higher if the first 
child is a boy rather than a girl (63 hours per year, t=3.0), but find no significant effects for 
subsequent children. 
  We find some significant effects of child gender on labor supply for both cohorts, though 
only the effects for the later cohort are substantial and pervasive. For the early cohort, the only 
significant difference is in the effect of the first child in the nonlinear specification:  60 hours more 
if the first child is a son relative to a daughter.  For men born after 1950, we find statistically and 
quantitatively significant positive effects of sons relative to daughters in every specification.  The 
linear specification indicates that each son increases his father’s labor supply by 40 hours per year 
more than (or about 2.5 times as much as) each daughter (t=2.2).  Having at least one son leads 
to about 73 more hours of work per year than having at least one daughter (t=2.7), and having a 
son as a first child leads to an increase in labor supply of about 69 hours per year more than a 
daughter (t=2.2). Thus the incremental effect of having a son rather than a daughter amounts to   19
more than 3 percent of total male labor supply.  In the non-linear specification, we find increases 
in labor supply for each of the gender-specific parities. 
  In summary, having sons vs. daughters leads to higher hourly wages and higher labor 
supply for fathers.  The labor supply effect is particularly striking, as we find significant effects for 
both the early and late cohorts and for a variety of specifications of the gender composition of a 
man’s offspring. 
 
V.  Discussion:  Why Do Men’s Outcomes Depend on Children’s Gender?   
Our results indicate that men work more and/or harder after having sons relative to 
daughters.  Furthermore, when we estimated the same specifications reported in Tables 6 and 7 
for women as well as men,
15 we found virtually no evidence that children’s gender affects 
women’s hourly wages and no evidence of an effect on labor supply. 
What economic factors could explain these findings? First, we consider how having sons 
relative to daughters might shift parents’ constraints.  If the returns to educating sons are greater 
than the returns to educating daughters, parents may work more if they have sons relative to 
daughters in order to finance their education. While there is limited evidence to suggest that 
parents spend more on sons’ education than on daughters’ education, the magnitudes would be too 
small to explain the difference in wages and labor supply of parents of boys relative to girls 
(Taubman [1990]).   
  Parents’ lifetime constraint sets may also differ by child gender if they expect more old 
age support from daughters relative to sons.  It is often observed that women are more likely to 
care for elderly parents than are men, perhaps because the opportunity cost of women’s time at 
the age at which parents need care is lower than the opportunity cost of men’s time.  However, 
                                                                 
15 These results are available from the authors upon request.   20
McGarry [1998] finds that men are less likely to care for elderly parents only if they have sisters, 
and that men with only male siblings are no less likely to care for parents than are women from 
female-only families.  This implies that the labor supply effects of  “at least one son” vs. “at least 
one daughter” would not be due to anticipated differences in old-age support. 
  Moreover, if the effects of children’s gender are due only to pecuniary factors such as 
differential costs or old-age support from sons and daughters, we would expect to find some 
effects on women’s outcomes, as well.  This would be particularly true for an old-age support 
motive, as women are more likely to outlive their husbands and require care in old-age.   
  One additional way that children’s may affect parents’ constraints is through 
demonstration effects.   Fathers or families may believe it is more important to model the 
traditional male role in society for sons than for daughters. 
  The alternative to a constraint explanation for fathers’ responses to child gender is a 
preference explanation.  If men prefer sons to daughters or value the time spent with sons more 
highly, then the value of marriage (or at least co-residence) with the child’s mother will be higher 
for fathers of sons. Morgan et al [1988] find that the birth of a son relative to a daughter 
increases the likelihood that a marriage will survive by approximately 7 percentage points using 
data from the U.S. Census.
16  Reduced probability of marital dissolution will increase the returns to 
marriage-specific investments, and we would expect this to lead to greater specialization within 
the marriage.  This is consistent with our finding that husbands work more in the labor market 
after a son is born relative to a daughter, but not with our finding of no differential increase in 
home production by mothers of sons. 
                                                                 
16 Their findings are supported by those of  Mott [1994] and Katzev et al [1994], who use data from the NLSY 
and National Survey of Families and Households, respectively.   Teachman and Schollaert [1989] find that 
women are likely to have a second child sooner when the first child is a son rather than a daughter, but this 
is attributed entirely to the reduced likelihood of marital dissolution due to the birth of the son.   21
We can also analyze the effects of child gender in the context of a bargaining model with 
a divorce threat point in which husbands and wives each allocate their resources to the production 
of household public goods and to private goods.   If men prefer sons and divorce causes a 
reduction in the child services that fathers receive, they will contribute more to household public 
goods and less to their private consumption of leisure in a marriage with sons.  Our labor supply 
results are consistent with this story, but the bargaining framework implies that child gender should 
affect the intrahousehold distribution of goods and time more generally.  Yeung et al [1999] (and 
others) find that boys spend more time with fathers than do girls.  This suggests that the increased 
in work intensity of men with sons is not at the expense of their contribution to the child-care 
component of household production, and is also consistent with the bargaining model.
17 
The theoretical models underlying the last two explanations are only relevant for two-
parent families.  We therefore have re-run the analyses for married and unmarried men, 
separately.  These results are summarized in Table 8.  We find that the boy vs. girl effects are 
larger, and generally more significant for married men.  However, for unmarried men we find that 
the coefficients on the “boys” variables tend to be smaller than the coefficients on the “girls” 
variables.  This suggests to us that selection bias is an issue when analyzing the data by fathers’ 
marital status.  In particular, since parents of boys are less likely to divorce than parents of girls,  if 
                                                                 
17 The dependence of other family outcomes, including divorce, on the gender of children suggests a couple 
of ways in which the relationship between children’s gender and labor supply and wages might be spurious.  
First,  Korenman and Neumark [1991] show that the marriage premium increases with the duration of the 
marriage.   If having sons relative to daughters increases the duration of a marriage, the gender effects may 
be proxying the effects of marriage duration.  In Appendix Tables A.2.1 and A.2.2 we report the results of 
the analyses reported in Tables 6 and 7 when length of marriage, and its square, are included in the 
regressions.  The findings on the gender effects change little.  Second, Teachman and Schollaert’s finding 
that having a son as a first child speeds the transition to having a second child would suggest that the 
effect of a first boy on labor market outcomes may be due to the fact that families with first sons are, on 
average, larger than families with first daughters.  However, we found that including total number of children 
in the specifications including FIRBOY/FIRGIRL and IFBOY/IFGIRL did not affect the magnitude or 
significance of the results (Appendix Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2).   22
men with less favorable unobservables are more likely to divorce, then divorced fathers of boys 
are a more “negatively selected” pool than divorced fathers of girls. 
   
VI.  Conclusion 
  In this paper we have estimated the effects of children, both total and by gender, on 
men’s labor supply and hourly wages. We find that fatherhood results in significantly higher wages 
and labor supply. We find that the relationship between children and labor market outcomes for 
fathers has changed;  men born after 1950 have larger labor supply responses to children than do 
men from earlier cohorts.  Also, the child effects are non-linear, with positive incremental effects 
on men’s hours and wages limited to the first two children.  
Most strikingly, we find that men’s outcomes respond differently to the births of sons 
rather than daughters. For the earlier cohort, there is some evidence that both wages and hours 
are higher after having sons relative to daughters; for the later cohort, there are very strong and 
highly significant effects of sons vs. daughters on hours worked. 
There are several implications of our findings.  First, although the role of children is 
typically ignored in studies of male labor supply and wage determination, fatherhood has 
quantitatively and statistically significant effects on both outcomes.  Second, since we observe 
increases in both hourly wages and annual hours of work for fathers, increased specialization of 
husbands and wives in response to parenthood is the dominant pattern for both early and late 
cohorts.  Third, the increase in men’s hourly wage rates suggests that additional research into the 
source of this “fatherhood premium” and its relationship to human capital investments, job 
changes, or promotions is warranted. 
Finally, the increased commitment to the labor market that men demonstrate after having 
sons relative to daughters provides surprising evidence of the significance of child gender for   23
families in the United States. Since we did not find evidence of gender effects on mother’s labor 
supply, it appears that the “first round” effects on household outcomes arise through the behavior 
of fathers, not mothers.
18  In conjunction with other research on the effects of child gender on 
divorce and father’s time with children, our results suggest that sons increase the value of 
marriage and family life for men. 
                                                                 
18 This echoes the findings in the child development literature summarized by Maccoby [1998] that mothers’ 
behavior towards sons and daughters tends to be more similar than that of fathers.    24
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Table 1: Means (Standard Deviations) of Key Variables 
 
 
  Early Cohort 
(Born 1950 or Earlier) 
Late Cohort 
(Born After 1950) 
















Married?  0.895  0.806 




















After First Child Born (Son)  0.43  0.32 
After First Child Born (Daughter)  0.36  0.30 
If at Least One Son  0.58  0.43 
If at Least One Daughter  0.53  0.41 
Number of Observations  11248  14957 
 
*Based on 11090 observations 




Frequency Distribution:  Number of Children 
Number of Observations 






By Individual*Time  By Individual 
(Maximum Number per Individual) 
  Born 1950 or Earlier  Born After 1950  Born 1950 or Earlier  Born After 1950 
































































































Frequency Distribution of Sons and Daughters 
Number of Observations 




  Born 1950 or 
Earlier 
Born After 1950    Born 1950 or 
Earlier 
Born After 1950 





















































Six Sons  0  0  Six Daughters  1 
(0.01) 
0 











  Born 1950 or 
Earlier 
Born After 1950    Born 1950 or 
Earlier 
Born After 1950 












































































Table 4a: The Effect of Marriage and Children on (Log Real Hourly) Wage 
(Entire Sample) 
 (Additional regressors include: dummy variables for: year of observation, years of education, age) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 (N =  25755 ) 
 



























Number of Children (0 if 
None or > 4) 
  0.017 
(0.010) 
    0.042 
(0.006) 
 
(Exactly) One Child 
 
    0.020 
(0.021) 
    0.071 
(0.012) 
(Exactly) Two Children 
 
    0.070 
(0.026) 
    0.131 
(0.014) 
(Exactly) Three Children 
 
    0.073 
(0.033) 
    0.125 
(0.019) 
(Exactly) Four Children 
 
    -0.04 
(0.065) 
    0.114 
(0.028) 








 Two Children 
- One Child  
    0.05 
(0.022) 
    0.060 
(0.011) 
 Three Children 
 - Two Children  
    0.003 
(0.03) 
    -0.006 
(0.015) 
 Four Children 
- Three Children  
    -0.113 
(0.062) 
    -0.011 
(0.025) 




Table 4b:  The Effect of Marriage and Children on (Log Real Hourly) Wage 
(By Cohort) 
 (Additional regressors include: dummy variables for: year of observation, years of education, age) 
















Born 1950 or 
Earlier  












(11090)  Number of Children (0 if 
None or > 4) 
  0.008 
(0.018) 
    0.043 
(0.008) 
 
  (Exactly) One Child 
 
    0.019 
(0.043) 
    0.097 
(0.019) 
  (Exactly) Two Children 
 
    0.076 
(0.048) 
    0.181 
(0.021) 
  (Exactly) Three Children 
 
    0.064 
(0.057) 
    0.136 
(0.029) 
  (Exactly) Four Children 
 
    -0.105 
(-0.102) 
    0.085 
(0.040) 










   Two Children 
- One Child  
    0.057 
(0.036) 
    0.084 
(0.016) 
   Three Children 
 – Two Children  
    -0.012 
(0.045) 
    -0.045 
(0.020) 
   Four Children 
- Three Children  
    -0.169 
(0.091) 
    -0.051 
(0.032) 


















(14665)  Number of Children (0 if 
None or > 4) 
  0.028 
(0.011) 
    0.044 
(0.008) 
 
  (Exactly) One Child 
 
    0.030 
(0.023) 
    0.057 
(0.015) 
  (Exactly) Two Children 
 
    0.075 
(0.029) 
    0.099 
(0.018) 
  (Exactly) Three Children 
 
    0.089 
(0.040) 
    0.127 
(0.026) 
  (Exactly) Four Children 
 
    0.057 
(0.073) 
    0.173 
(0.041) 










   Two Children 
- One Child  
    0.045 
(0.025) 
    0.042 
(0.014) 
   Three Children 
 – Two Children  
    0.014 
(0.035) 
    0.028 
(0.019) 
   Four Children 
- Three Children  
    -0.032 
(0.073) 
    0.046 
(0.036) 
  R-squared  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.60  0.60  0.60  
 
 
Table 5a: The Effect of Marriage and Children on Annual Hours Worked 
(Entire Sample) 
 (Additional regressors include: dummy variables for: year of observation, years of education, age) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 (N =  26205) 
 



























Number of Children (0 if 
None or > 4) 
  45.86 
(10.245) 
    38.416 
(7.266) 
 
(Exactly) One Child 
 
    68.297 
(22.983) 
    82.023 
(14.849) 
(Exactly) Two Children 
 
    138.562 
(25.595) 
    108.165 
(17.729) 
(Exactly) Three Children 
 
    138.922 
(34.375) 
    113.230 
(24.544) 
(Exactly) Four Children 
 
    126.268 
(66.625) 
    152.212 
(36.551) 








 Two Children 
- One Child  
    70.265 
(24.215) 
    26.142 
(13.554) 
 Three Children 
 – Two Children  
    0.360 
(30) 
    5.065 
(17.907) 
 Four Children 
- Three Children  
    -12.654 
(63.27) 
    38.982 
(31.111) 





Table 5b:  The Effect of Marriage and Children on Annual Hours Worked 
(By Cohort) 
 (Additional regressors include: dummy variables for: year of observation, years of education, age) 
















Born 1950 or 
Earlier 
Married












(11248)  Number of Children    45.183 
(16.578) 
    25.850 
(10.955) 
 
  One Child 
 
    111.941 
(39.98) 
    102.453 
(24.218) 
  Two Children 
 
    174.566 
(41.668) 
    102.874 
(27.633) 
  Three Children 
 
    137.205 
(52.801) 
    100.369 
(37.350) 
  Four Children 
 
    184.275 
(102.62) 
    91.639 
(51.857) 








   Two Children 
- One Child  
    62.625 
(39.141) 
    0.421 
(21.2) 
   Three Children 
 – Two Children  
    -37.361 
(45.644) 
    -2.505 
(25.05) 
   Four Children 
- Three Children  
    47.07 
(98.148) 
    -8.73 
(43.65) 


















(14957)  Number of Children    46.971 
(12.842) 
    52.556 
(9.776) 
 
  One Child 
 
    41.381 
(27.63) 
    72.455 
(18.821) 
  Two Children 
 
    120.189 
(31.699) 
    121.436 
(23.201) 
  Three Children 
 
    157.128 
(45.437) 
    138.084 
(32.851) 
  Four Children 
 
    78.916 
(78.028) 
    240.877 
(52.599) 








   Two Children 
- One Child  
    78.808 
(29.431 
    48.981 
(17.732) 
   Three Children 
 – Two Children  
    36.939 
(39.603) 
    16.648 
(24.284) 
   Four Children 
- Three Children  
    -78.212 
(77.065) 
    102.793 
(46.109) 
  R-squared  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.48  0.48  0.48 
  
Table 6:  The Effect of Sons vs. Daughters on (Log Real Hourly) Wage 
 
 (Additional regressors include: dummy variables for: marital status, years of education, age) 




  (1) 
Full Sample 
(2) 
Born 1950 or Earlier 
(3) 
Born After 1950 
















  Number of Boys 







  If More Than 3 Boys or More 























  If at Least One Boy 







(6)  After First Child, Boy  (0 if No 







  After First Child, Girl (0 if 







  After First Child Boy 























  One Boy  























  Two Boys 























  Three Boys  







  If More Than 3 Boys or More 








Table 7:  The Effect of Sons vs. Daughters on Annual Hours Worked 
 
 (Additional regressors include: dummy variables for: marital status, years of education, age) 




  (1) 
Full Sample 
(2) 
Born 1950 or 
Earlier 
(3) 
Born After 1950 
















  Number of Boys 







  If More Than 3 Boys or More 























  If at Least One Boy 







(6)  After First Child, Boy  (0 if No 







  After First Child, Girl (0 if 







  After First Child Boy 























  One Boy  
– One Girl  
63.074 
(21.634) 




















  Two Boys 























  Three Boys  







  If More Than 3 Boys or More 








   
  
Table 8:  The Effects of Sons vs. Daughters on Wages and Hours 
Married Men vs. Unmarried Men 
(Additional regressors include: dummy variables for years of education, age)
 
(Fixed effects estimates; standard errors in parentheses) 
 
























(4)  Number of Boy  













  (5)  If At Least One Boy  













  (6)  After First Child Boy  













  (7)  One Boy 













    Two Boys 













    Three Boys 













    Sample Size (N) 
 
21803  9927  11876  3952  1163  2789 
Annual  
Hours of  
(4)  Number of Boy  













Work  (5)  If At Least One Boy  













  (6)  After First Child Boy  













  (7)  One Boy 













    Two Boys 













    Three Boys 













    Sample Size (N) 
 
22140  10072  12068  4065  1176  2889 
  
Appendix Table A.1.1:  The Effect of Children on (Log Real Hourly) Wage 
 (Additional regressors include: dummy variables for: year of observation, years of education, age, if married) 



















  0.037 
(0.005) 
 
  One Child 
 
  0.020 
(0.021) 
  0.071 
(0.012) 
  Two Children 
 
  0.070 
(0.026) 
  0.131 
(0.014) 
  Three Children 
 
  0.073 
(0.033) 
  0.126 
(0.019) 
  Four Children 
 
  -0.040 
(0.065) 
  0.114 
(0.028) 
  Five Children 
 
  -0.071 
(0.125) 
  0.167 
(0.053) 
  Six Children 
 
  -0.484 
(0.511) 
  -0.221 
(0.109) 
  Seven Children 
 
  -0.685 
(0.375) 








  0.037 
(0.008) 
 
  One Child 
 
  0.019 
(0.043) 
  0.097 
(0.019) 
  Two Children 
 
  0.076 
(0.048) 
  0.182 
(0.021) 
  Three Children 
 
  0.064 
(0.057) 
  0.138 
(0.029) 
  Four Children 
 
  -0.105 
(0.102) 
  0.088 
(0.040) 
  Five Children 
 
  0.123 
(0.138) 
  0.196 
(0.073) 
  Six Children 
 
  0.014 
(0.227) 
  0.048 
(0.157) 
  Seven Children 
 
  -0.687 
(0.379) 








  0.039 
(0.008) 
 
  One Child 
 
  0.030 
(0.024) 
  0.057 
(0.015) 
  Two Children 
 
  0.074 
(0.029) 
  0.098 
(0.018) 
  Three Children 
 
  0.088 
(0.040) 
  0.127 
(0.026) 
  Four Children 
 
  0.056 
(0.073) 
  0.167 
(0.041) 
  Five Children 
 
  -0.354 
(0.136) 
  0.151 
(0.079) 
  Six Children 
 
  -0.798 
(0.710) 
  -0.40 
(0.152) 
  Seven Children 
 
  0.0 
       (0.0) 
  0.0 





Appendix Table A.1.2:  The Effect of Children on Annual Hours Worked 
 (Additional regressors include: dummy variables for: year of observation, years of education, age, if married) 


















  32.869 
(7.055) 
 
  One Child 
 
  68.431 
(22.983) 
  82.014 
(14.849) 
  Two Children 
 
  138.784 
(25.596) 
  108.044 
(17.729) 
  Three Children 
 
  139.198 
(34.375) 
  113.505 
(24.545) 
  Four Children 
 
  126.569 
(66.627) 
  151.424 
(36.558) 
  Five Children 
 
  -28.354 
(131.40) 
  96.996 
(66.782) 
  Six Children 
 
  -241.498 
(391.595) 
  -168.659 
(140.288) 
  Seven Children 
 
  542.48 
(443.952) 








  21.429 
(10.486) 
 
  One Child 
 
  111.625 
(39.975) 
  102.335 
(24.223) 
  Two Children 
 
  174.402 
(41.648) 
  102.776 
(27.637) 
  Three Children 
 
  136.768 
(52.799) 
  99.997 
(37.364) 
  Four Children 
 
  184.436 
(102.632) 
  90.991 
(51.881) 
  Five Children 
 
  -11.553 
(184.471) 
  21.903 
(93.366) 
  Six Children 
 
  320.331 
(345.975) 
  30.671 
(206.745) 
  Seven Children 
 
  927.751 
(108.740) 








  46.496 
(9.606) 
 
  One Child 
 
  41.198 
(27.631) 
  71.735 
(18.815) 
  Two Children 
 
  119.703 
(31.685) 
  120.177 
(23.195) 
  Three Children 
 
  156.065 
(45.410) 
  136.872 
(32.841) 
  Four Children 
 
  78.182 
(78.217) 
  233.055 
(52.635) 
  Five Children 
 
  -80.628 
(216.475) 
  179.564 
(96.554) 
  Six Children 
 
  -565.50 
(449.038) 
  -361.981 
(194.292) 
  Seven Children 
 
  -1903.692 
(119.201) 







Appendix Table A.2.1:  The Effect of Sons vs. Daughters on (Log Real Hourly) Wage 
(Additional regressors include: dummy variables for years of education, age, if married) 
(Fixed effects estimates, standard errors in parentheses) 
 


















  (Length of Marriage)








  Number of Boys 
- Number of Girls  
0.008 
(0.011) 
     
  If at Least One Boy 
- If at Least One Girl  
  -0.004 
(0.016) 
   
  After First Child Boy 
- After First Child Girl  
    0.011 
(0.018) 
 
  One Boy  
– One Girl  
      0.001 
(.017) 
  Two Boys 
 – Two Girls 
      0.011 
(0.022) 
  Three Boys  
– Three Girls  












  (Length of Marriage)








  Number of Boys 
- Number of Girls  
0.032 
(0.016) 
     
  If at Least One Boy 
- If at Least One Girl  
  0.032 
(0.026) 
   
  After First Child Boy 
- After First Child Girl  
    0.054 
(0.030) 
 
  One Boy  
– One Girl  
      0.024 
(0.027) 
  Two Boys 
 – Two Girls 
      0.043 
(0.034) 
  Three Boys  
– Three Girls  












  (Length of Marriage)








  Number of Boys 
- Number of Girls  
-0.016 
(0.014) 
     
  If at Least One Boy 
- If at Least One Girl  
  -0.028 
(0.021) 
   
  After First Child Boy 
- After First Child Girl  
    -0.023 
(0.024) 
 
`  One Boy  
– One Girl  
      -0.019 
(0.022) 
  Two Boys 
 – Two Girls 
      -0.014 
(0.029) 
  Three Boys  
– Three Girls  




Appendix Table A.2.2:  The Effect of Sons vs. Daughters on Annual Hours of Work 
(Additional regressors include: dummy variables for years of education, age, if married) 
(Fixed effects estimates, standard errors in parentheses) 
 


















  (Length of Marriage)








  Number of Boys 
- Number of Girls  
11.552 
(13.521) 
     
  If at Least One Boy 
- If at Least One Girl  
  53.047 
(21.478) 
   
  After First Child Boy 
- After First Child Girl  
    64.489 
(24.375) 
 
  One Boy  
– One Girl  
      63.257 
(21.633) 
  Two Boys 
 – Two Girls 
      26.465 
(29.589) 
  Three Boys  
– Three Girls  












  (Length of Marriage)








  Number of Boys 
- Number of Girls  
-25.261 
(20.192) 
     
  If at Least One Boy 
- If at Least One Girl  
  25.821 
(34.817) 
   
  After First Child Boy 
- After First Child Girl  
    54.91 
(39.423) 
 
  One Boy  
– One Girl  
      60.885 
(35.094) 
  Two Boys 
 – Two Girls 
      -16.404 
(45.497) 
  Three Boys  
– Three Girls  












  (Length of Marriage)








  Number of Boys 
- Number of Girls  
39.793 
(18.032) 
     
  If at Least One Boy 
- If at Least One Girl  
  73.107 
(27.379) 
   
  After First Child Boy 
- After First Child Girl  
    67.831 
(30.993) 
 
  One Boy  
– One Girl  
      68.214 
(27.574) 
  Two Boys 
 – Two Girls 
      61.8 
(39.483) 
  Three Boys  
– Three Girls  







Appendix Table A.3.1:  The Effect of Sons vs. Daughters on (Log Real Hourly) Wage 
Controlling for Number of Children 
 
(Additional regressors include: dummy variables for years of education, age) 
(Fixed effects estimates, standard errors in parentheses) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Cohort  All  All  Early  Early  Late  Late 




  0.040 
(0.023) 
  -0.017 
(0.020) 
 




  0.013 
(0.023) 
  0.012 
(0.020) 
 
If at Least One Boy 
- If at Least One Girl  
-0.004 
(0.015) 
  0.027 
(0.026) 
  -0.029 
(0.021) 
 
After First Child, Boy 
 
  0.049 
(0.017) 
  0.109 
(0.027) 
  0.012 
(0.022) 
After First Child, Girl 
 
  0.039 
(0.017) 
  0.057 
(0.028) 
  0.033 
(0.022) 
After First Child Boy 
- After First Child Girl  
  0.010 
(0.018) 
  0.052 
(0.030) 
  -0.021 
(0.025) 
Number of Children, if < 4 

































Appendix Table A.3.2:  The Effect of Sons vs. Daughters on Annual Hours of Work 
Controlling for Number of Children 
 
(Additional regressors include: dummy variables for years of education, age) 
(Fixed effects estimates, standard errors in parentheses) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Cohort  All  All  Early  Early  Late  Late 




  68.037 
(30.355) 
  52.631 
(25.239) 
 




  44.995 
(30.517) 
  -18.887 
(25.346) 
 
If at Least One Boy 
- If at Least One Girl  
53.227 
(21.481) 
  23.042 
(34.737) 
  71.518 
(27.426) 
 
After First Child, Boy 
 
  97.319 
(21.985) 
  130.709 
(35.780) 
  72.037 
(27.928) 
After First Child, Girl 
 
  33.150 
(22.438) 
  75.677 
(35.966) 
  1.341 
(28.805) 
After First Child Boy 
- After First Child Girl  
  65.169 
(24.738) 
  55.032 
(39.793) 
  70.696 
(30.972) 
Number of Children, if < 4 













If 4 or More Children 
 
65.082 
(44.785) 
70.246 
(37.803) 
-37.378 
(65.279) 
-24.622 
(54.466) 
174.377 
(62.602) 
181.949 
(53.748) 
 